

Li-Ion Batteries, SMS and Incidents



ANZSASI

Michael Burdick

June 2017



OVERVIEW

- ▣ Who Regulates Hazmat in the USA
- ▣ Hazmat Specialist Responsibilities
- ▣ Regulatory Documents
- ▣ Brief SMS
- ▣ ValuJet, Flight 592
- ▣ Lithium Battery Incidents
- ▣ Lithium Battery Trends

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION
(FAA)

Pipeline & Hazardous Material Safety
Administration (PHMSA)

FEDERAL MARITIME
ADMINISTRATION

FEDERAL HIGHWAY
ADMINISTRATION

FEDERAL TRANSPORT
ADMINISTRATION

FEDERAL RAILROAD
ADMINISTRATION

*
U. S. COAST GUARD
*



DOT

The diagram shows a central black oval with the text 'DOT' in white, italicized font. Six lines radiate from the oval to connect it to six surrounding text blocks. The top-left block is 'FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA)' in yellow. The top-right block is 'Pipeline & Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA)' in yellow. The left block is 'FEDERAL MARITIME ADMINISTRATION' in black. The right block is 'FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION' in black. The bottom-left block is 'FEDERAL TRANSPORT ADMINISTRATION' in black. The bottom-right block is 'FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION' in black. At the bottom center, a line connects the oval to the text '* U. S. COAST GUARD *', where 'U. S. COAST GUARD' is underlined and yellow.

FAA HAZMAT SPECIALIST


Responsibilities:

- ✈ **Mission-Ensure and Promote Aviation Safety**
- ✈ Compliance and Enforcement of the HMR's
 - ✈ \$450.00 Min \$75,000.00 Max per violation

Priorities:

- ✈ Passenger Airlines
 - ✈ Indirect Air Carriers (IAC) (Part 109)
 - ✈ All-Cargo Airlines
 - ✈ Repair Stations (Part 145 certificate)
 - ✈ **Shippers (Companies & Individuals)**

Printed References






- Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 100 – 185 (49 CFR)

- International Civil Aviation Organization Technical Instructions (ICAO TI)

- International Air Transport Association Dangerous Goods Regulations (IATA DGR): **Not a regulatory document!!**

- 2016 Emergency Response Guidebook



SMS

SAFETY POLICY: Commitment

SRM: Risk Identification

SAFETY ASSURANCE: Verify

SAFETY PROMOTION: Attitude

SMS & RISK INTERFACE

- ▣ DATA COLLECTION
- ▣ DATA QUALITY
- ▣ DETERMINE RISK
- ▣ MITIGATE RISK
 - Challenging Budgetary Environment

ValuJet Flight 592

- May 11, 1996
- DC-9 w/ 110 passengers onboard
- Impacted the Florida Everglades at 440 kts.
- NTSB Concluded: “The Accident was caused by improperly packaged, marked, and labeled Oxygen Generators.”



Valujet flight 592




FLIGHT 592 DEBRIS FIELD

COCKPIT VOICE
RECORDER

FLIGHT DATA
RECORDER

NOSE
LANDING
GEAR

IMPACT
CRATER



Flight 592



COCKPIT EMERGENCY REPORTED 2:13 p.m.

PLANE DISAPPEARED 2:25 p.m.

MIAMI INTL AIRPORT 2:03 p.m. Takeoff

20 MINUTES TO TRAGEDY

2:03 p.m.: Valujet Airline Flight 592 takes off from Miami International Airport, heads over the Atlantic Ocean and then northwest, over Atlanta.

2:13 p.m.: Crew reports an emergency - smoke in the cockpit. Plane turns back to Miami International.

2:25 p.m.: Over the Everglades, the plane disappears from the Miami radar screen. Eyewitnesses say it dove into the wetlands at a steep angle.

A Valujet DC-9 carrying 104 passengers and a crew of five crashed Saturday afternoon in the Everglades. The cockpit crew reported smoke on board and tried to return to the airport, but the aircraft slammed nose-first at a steep angle into the inhospitable marshland before it reached the runway.



CRASH SITE



BROWARD CO.

DADE CO.

US27

Krome Avenue

Florida Turnpike































Colin Braley / Reuters



Safety failures in ValuJet crash were avoidable

By Robert Davis
USA TODAY



Goglia: ValuJet 'chain of events' could have been changed.

It takes, on average, more than five separate safety system failures to cause a commercial jet to crash in the USA. Officials say that in the case of ValuJet Flight 592, there were even more and the chain of mistakes, miscues and missed opportunities that led to the May 11 crash in the Florida Everglades would have been easy to break. The crash killed all 110 people aboard.

After public hearings last week, the holes in the system are painfully clear to families of victims and to federal officials responsible for aviation safety.

"Change anything at all in that chain of events and the outcome would be very different," says John Goglia, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) member who presided over the hearings. "Just one change could have stopped the whole thing," says Robert Roberts of Miami, who lost his grandson in the crash. Investigators say 144 oxygen generators loaded into the forward cargo hold of the DC-9 fuelled a fierce fire, causing the plane to crash.

er, and did not have the 15-cent safety caps that would prevent them from firing accidentally. The caps and labels are required by law.

A criminal probe is ongoing. SabreTech's mechanics signed federal documents saying they had put safety caps on the generators when they knew the generators still needed them. Both mechanics, who signed for work performed by hundreds of others, told investigators they feared they would be fired if they didn't sign.

► The FAA inspector

An avoidable disaster

VALUJET FLIGHT 592
 The crash west of Miami claimed 110 lives. An inquiry suggests that it need not have happened.

ValuJet retains ultimate responsibility for the condition and control of all of its aircraft. That remains true whether its maintenance is performed "in-house" or contracted out.

The crash of ValuJet Flight 592 could have been prevented. That's one conclusion to be drawn from the National Transportation Safety Board's week of hearings in Miami. A report is due next spring.

The end of these hearings won't end the anguish of the 110 victims' loved ones. Neither should it end the inquiry to see whether criminal negligence occurred — and for Congress to see whether new laws are needed. Expect high-profile civil trials as well.

Much attention was focused on what is now believed to be the crash's direct cause: a white-hot fire that began among oxygen canisters improperly stowed in the plane's forward cargo hold. Yet the hearings also revealed a disturbing chain of events that preceded the Atlanta-gliding plane's plunge into the Everglades. The panel heard testimony suggesting a broad pattern of failure.

For starters, ValuJet's rapid growth apparently outstripped the capacity of the airline's managers and the Federal Aviation Administration's safety inspectors to monitor its operations. Though an Washington FAA manager recommended in February that the airline be grounded, it was only after the May 11 crash that ValuJet was finally grounded.

Other testimony suggested that SabreTech, the company that maintained ValuJet's maintenance in Miami, had similar quality-control problems.

Whatever SabreTech's role, however, week's most damning testimony concerned the role of the FAA. It is supposed to ensure that air travel is safe by heading off accidents before they occur. Instead, the FAA too often waits to react with other issues, from the threat of terrorism to the obsolescence of computer and radar systems used in air-traffic control. Complicating its mission were pressures to "right-size" at a time of burgeoning workloads.

Belatedly the FAA has proposed rules — first urged by the NTSB in 1988 — to require fire-fighting devices in cargo holds. Also belatedly, the agency has announced the addition of 118 inspectors in the field warned of growing risks and pleaded in vain for more help. Nor can Congress entirely escape blame. It allowed the airline-ticket charge to expire for eight months, thus drying up a source of funding that should have been used to promote safer air travel.

Is air travel safe? Statistics say Yes — compared to other modes of travel and to air travel in the past. Yet the crash of Flight 592 was so horrific — and the revelations since so disturbing — that some travelers' confidence has been shattered. Who will restore their trust?

Editorial

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Lithium Batteries




Approximately 152+ air incidents involving batteries carried as cargo or baggage to date.

Lithium ion cell or battery: means a rechargeable electrochemical cell or battery in which the positive and negative electrodes are both intercalation compounds (intercalated lithium exists in an ionic or quasi-atomic form with the lattice of the electrode material) constructed with no metallic lithium in either electrode. A lithium polymer cell or battery that uses lithium ion chemistries, as described herein, is regulated as a lithium ion cell or battery.

(UN 38.3 Manual of Test and Criteria 5th revised edition, Amendment 1 - With Amendment 2 Revisions)



Watt-hour (Wh): means a unit of energy equivalent to one watt (1 W) of work acting for one hour (1 h) of time. The Watt-hour rating of a lithium ion cell or battery is determined by multiplying the rated capacity of a cell or battery in ampere-hours, by its nominal voltage.



The calculation:

Volts (V) x Ampere-hour (Ah) = Watt hours (Wh). 158.4 Wh


Early Boeing 787 Battery Issues

Boeing 787 catches fire

- The Dreamliner fire at Heathrow airport on Friday, was located in a different part of the plane than previous fires caused by Lithium-ion batteries.

Note: Diagrams are not to scale.

The Heathrow fire broke out on the top of the plane, just in front of the tail.



The Jan. 16 ANA emergency landing in Japan was caused by smoke from the forward battery compartment

The Jan. 7 fire on JAL at Boston Logan Airport was in the aft or rear battery compartment

Cells on the left side



Substantial thermal damage


Cells on the right side



Moderate thermal damage

Battery in Japan Airlines Boeing 787 that caught fire in Boston.
January 7, 2013

787 Batteries at SEA Cargo



Boeing and Airbus Advisory

- ▣ Boeing: July 17, 2015

“that the aircraft fire protection features are not able to adequately protect against.”


- ▣ Airbus: July 24, 2015

“render ineffective, the required Halon concentration for fire suppression and other control mechanism. There is the high likelihood of consequential significant structural damage to the aircraft.”


SAFO'S/ EO

- ▣ 16001-19/01/2016: SRA
- ▣ 16004-06/05/2016: Contacting Shippers (ICAO)
- ▣ 16011-16/09/2016: Recalled Batteries and Devices
- ▣ Emergency Order 20169288-14/10/2016: Samsung

LAX Battery Fire



FAA TESTING of Li-ion Batteries




Thermal Runaway



INCIDENTS AND ISSUES

UPS B744 at Dubai on September 3rd 2010, crash result of cargo fire









Fire damaged remains of battery pack with a fractured cell



Additional battery pack remains [LH]/D-Cell size lithium primary batteries. Photo shows fire damaged and undamaged batteries [RH]



Lithium primary button sized flat cell batteries (watch style) with small circuit board



36-cell lithium-ion battery pack with thermal damage.



36-cell lithium-ion battery pack with multiple vented cells



Lithium-ion, mobile phone type battery

Crash site in daylight (Photo: APA/EPA/Ali Haider):



Asiana Cargo B744, West of Jeju International Airport on July 28, 2011, crashed result of a cargo fire

Obtained from Aircraft and Railway Accident Investigation Board (ARAIB)
Interim Report Reference: AAR1105



Picture by AviationNewsToday.com



Burnt through skin panel (Photo: ARAIB)



One package containing 12 Lithium-Ion battery cells (Photo: ARAIB):



Debris floating off Jeju Island (Photo: AP):



ASAA POS EVENT

October 12, 2015



SMOKE AFFECTED AREA




FIGURE 1: THE 737-900 CABIN LAYOUT


SEA BATTERY INCIDENTS

5 Incidents:

- 4 Vape related
- 1 'Undetermined'

Incident One: JUNE 16, 2017 a 22 year old female passenger on ASAA






Incident Two: OCTOBER 23, 2016 a 28 year old male passenger on CALA






Incident Three: November 16, 2016 a 50 year old male passenger








Incident Four: December 29, 2016 a unknown age female passenger





COMMUNICATION = VALID
DATA

Communication!



NOTIFICATION of INCIDENTS

49CFR 171.15 Immediate notice of certain hazardous materials incidents.

(a) *General*. As soon as practical but no later than 12 hours after the occurrence of any incident described in paragraph (b) of this section, each person in physical possession of the hazardous material must provide notice by telephone to the National Response Center (NRC) on 800-424-8802

NOTIFICATION of INCIDENTS

- ▣ (6) During transportation by aircraft, a fire, violent rupture, explosion or dangerous evolution of heat (*i.e.*, an amount of heat sufficient to be dangerous to packaging or personal safety to include charring of packaging, melting of packaging, scorching of packaging, or other evidence) occurs as a direct result of a battery or battery-powered device.

3 Unreported Incidents in PDX



Airport Investigation Resources

- ▣ Best Source
 - ARFF
 - AIRPORT PD
 - AIRPORT
 - AIRLINE
 - SECURITY

Reporting and Response

Partnerships with the aviation community

- ▣ Airline
- ▣ Cargo
- ▣ ARFF
- ▣ Police
- ▣ Consignees

Risk Mitigation

- ▣ New packaging guidelines
- ▣ New Classifications
- ▣ Awareness (Outreach)
- ▣ Valid Data

OUTREACH & UPCOMING THREATS


Keep them with you!



Federal Aviation
Administration

ELECTRONIC CIGARETTES & SPARE LITHIUM BATTERIES FORBIDDEN IN CHECKED BAGGAGE


Also remove them from any carry-on bags that are checked at the gate or planeside.



USING OR CHARGING E-CIGARETTES ONBOARD THE AIRCRAFT IS FORBIDDEN

www.faa.gov/go/PackSafe

HOMEMADE DANGERS



E-Commerce




Rideable Carry-on Luggage!





Lithium Batteries built into suitcases



Specifications

Dimensions

22" x 14" x 9" / 55,88 x 35,56 x 22,86 cm

Weight

9.4 lbs / 4.26 kg

Materials

Trilayer polycarbonate and nylon

Color

Black with blue accents

Storage

34L packing volume; 15" laptop compartment

Location Tracking

Equipped with 3G Cellular Data and GPS

App Communication

Bluetooth controls lock and functionality

Compatibility

iOS 8.0 or later and Android 4.4 and above

USB Ports

2 standard USB ports (one USB charging cable included)

Battery

10.400 mAh capacity; charge phone 5-6x

Warranty

TSA-approved lock, FAA-compliant battery and 3G
2 years against defects in materials and electronic defects


Electronic 'travel' bikes



Self-Propelled Stroller Leads the Way to Hands-Free Parenting



Surfboards



ZUNUM Aero-Lithium battery Aircraft





HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY

QUESTIONS?

