



Flight Safety Foundation CFIT/ALAR ACTION GROUP STATUS REPORT

at the
Annual ANZSASI Meeting
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by

Captain Stu Julian

IFALPA Member FSF CAAG





OVERVIEW

- CFIT Background
- CFIT Implementation
- Implementation Shortcomings
- ALAR Update
- CFIT/ALAR Action Group (CAAG)
- Conclusion & Recommendations





CFIT BACKGROUND

- Final reports completed in 1996
- CFIT Implementation Team set up in 1996
- Implementation Plan established in 1997
- CFIT Education/Training Aid distributed in addition to other products, from 1997





CFIT E & TA





CFIT IMPLEMENTATION

- Implementation Team
 - Comprised of high level Industry representatives
 - Provided overall direction
 - Focus activities and messages
 - Identify leverage points
 - Develop supporting organisational structure





IMPLEMENTATION SHORTCOMINGS (1)



- Participation
 - Limited Air Carriers & Corporate Operators
 - Few Regional Carriers involved
 - Airframe Manufacturers disagreement
 - Little Regulatory involvement
 - Limited geographical diversity
 - Few Trade Associations
 - No Insurers





IMPLEMENTATION SHORTCOMINGS (2)

- Scope
 - No tracking of Education/Training Aid
 - Focused message never developed
 - Leverage point not identified
 - No metric for success measurement
 - No supporting organisation





IMPLEMENTATION SHORTCOMINGS (3)

- Planning
 - Haphazard contacts with regional segments of Industry
 - No definite plan to accomplish desired action
 - No plan for a communication campaign





IMPLEMENTATION SHORTCOMINGS (4)

- Conclusions
 - Implementation well intentioned, but only partially effective
 - Must apply lessons learned to future CFIT and ALAR implementation activities








ALAR UPDATE

- Final reports of Teams submitted to last IASS/EASS meetings
- FSF Flight Safety Digest published
- Other products being developed e.g.
 - ALAR/CFIT overview presentations
 - Various ALAR safety bulletins
 - ALAR + CFIT Training Aid





Training aid format





CFIT/ALAR ACTION GROUP (CAAG)

- Formed from established CFIT and ALAR Steering and Implementation Teams
- Previous goals modified
- New Purpose established
- Implementation tasks defined





CAAG (cont.)

- Goal
 - To reduce the rate of CFIT & ALA for aircraft with MTOW of 5700 Kg and above by 50% by the end of 2003
 - Rate measured by three year rolling average with baseline established in 1998





CAAG (cont.)

- Purpose
 - To develop and implement CFIT and ALA intervention strategies worldwide
 - To measure their effectiveness





CAAG (cont.)

- IMPLEMENTATION TASKS
 - Leadership
 - Strategies
 - Communication
 - Products
 - Distribution
 - Measurement





CAAG ACTION PLANS

- Support from the FSF Board of Governors
- Identify Regional Champions
- Secure more industry support and train facilitators
- Define and complete product development
- Integrate with other safety initiatives





CAAG PRIORITIES

- FSF APPROVAL
 - FSF Advisory Committee refines and supported CAAG proposals in April 1999
 - FSF Board of Governors approval now achieved





CAAG PRIORITIES (cont.)

- REGIONAL CHAMPIONS
 - Are respected and influential individuals
 - Are energetic and enthusiastic ‘Doers’
 - Know the local language, culture and environment
 - Will lead and establish regional support
 - Will be supported by FSF/CAAG





CAAG PRIORITIES (cont.)

- CFIT + ALAR Training Aid being developed by Airbus Industrie with CAAG help
- User adaptable electronic format adopted
- Includes briefing material for line flight crew
- Future safety bulletins planned to sustain knowledge and awareness






About the CD ROM structure

- Navigator :
 - general menu page with selection keys
- Executive Summary :
 - step-by-step approach
- Briefing Bulletins (Word)
- Presentations (PowerPoint)





Step by step approach





Use of the CFIT / ALAR Education and Training Aid



- Stand alone reading and viewing
- Source material for :
 - Classroom lectures
 - CRM topical discussions
 - Simulator scenarios (LOFT)
 - Airline specific bulletins
 - Airline safety magazine articles





CAAG OBJECTIVES

- WHAT NEXT?
 - Integrate with ICAO Oversight programme
 - Coordinate with other safety initiatives
 - Develop the communications campaign
 - Use regional Workshops and Seminars
 - Distribute products when available





CONCLUSIONS

- The CFIT implementation shortcomings had to be recognised and overcome
- The formation of CAAG was essential
- New Terms of Reference and Objectives for the CAAG were necessary
- Even greater efforts are needed to reduce CFIT & Approach and Landing accidents





RECOMMENDATIONS

- Support these proposals
- Help us identify and appoint the regional champions
- Give the CAAG the long term commitment necessary to achieve its goal
- Share the pride of achievement with our collective efforts





Thank you





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BAE SYSTEMS

CFIT Risks

Flight crew errors

Used DME instead of cross-bearing for desired intersection.

The pilot not flying (PNF), did not challenge the Captains error.

Communications


- Did not read back frequency change.
- Misinformed tower of aircraft position.
- Did not ensure adequate terrain clearance

Navigation

- Selecting the wrong frequency
- Selecting the wrong radial or heading
- Misreading charts.

Procedure

- Not completing checklists or briefs
- Not following prescribed checklist
- Failing to consult charts



Weather

87 % of CFIT accidents were in IMC.

Day / Night

50% of CFIT accidents were at night.

Automatics

FMS / Autoflight problems are contributing factors





BAE SYSTEMS

CFIT Risks

Most CFIT accidents occur within 15 NM of the runway threshold.

60 % of the approaches were non precision or not stabilized after FAF

Flight crew errors

Descended below safe altitude IMC

Incorrect setting or reading of the barometric altimeter

Did not request updated weather information.

Used DME than cross - bearing for desired intersection.

Commenced descent to MDA before reaching FAF

Did not call out 1,000 feet above field level.

Descended below DH in IMC

No radio altitude call-outs



Rushed approach

Did not go around

Did not follow SOP

The pilot not flying did not challenge a descent below DH

Did not pull up

following a GPWS

"PULL UP PULL UP" warning

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